processes to integrate with another political unit, its independence should be respected by foreigners.
Yet this self-determination principle has proved enduringly difficult to theorize.
Among the many questions it faces are: how do we define the "self"? Does selfdetermination require democratic governance, or is it compatible with non-democratic arrangements? How does it cohere with other international legal principles, such as territorial integrity? Does self-determination apply only to overseas dependencies, or also to internal minorities?
While the self-determination principle's contours are disputed, international law clearly recognizes decolonization as a central application of it. As Antonio Cassese emphasizes, self-determination was "perceived and relied upon as a legal entitlement to decolonization." 6 Most ordinary people also agree that the liberation of colonized peoples was a moral triumph. There is widespread consensus that decolonization was not just a legal imperative, but a moral one as well.
This paper examines three philosophical theories of self-determination's value, and asks which one best captures the reasons why decolonization was morally warranted.
If we can get clear about the values implicated by self-determination in the colonial
context-where our moral intuitions are strongest-we can then ask, in a second step,
whether these values extend to further cases. This strategy may enable progress in theorizing self-determination in more controversial areas, like humanitarian intervention, secession, federalism, or devolution. Indeed, I think that the associative view of selfdetermination defended here does have implications beyond decolonization, and I say more about these implications at the end of the paper. Ultimately I believe that selfdetermination is not a sui generis value that applies to decolonization alone. Rather, I our intuitions about decolonization can be fully justified only by invoking a more general interest on the part of alienated groups in redrawing political boundaries. This interest, I
believe, may also justify self-determination in other cases, such as autonomy for indigenous peoples, and greater independence for Scotland or Quebec. I argue that those who strongly support decolonization may have reason to endorse independence for these other minorities as well.
Consider three accounts of the reasons for decolonization:
(1) The Instrumentalist View: Decolonization was morally required because subject peoples were unjustly governed. What gave these peoples self-determination rights was the fact that colonial states failed to achieve minimally just rule.
(2) The Democratic View: Decolonization was morally required because subject peoples lacked democratic representation. What gave these peoples selfdetermination rights was their claim to be politically enfranchised.
(3) The Associative View: Decolonization was morally required because subject peoples were unable to affirm the political institutions their rulers imposed on them. What gave colonized peoples self-determination rights was their claim to be cooperative partners in a political institution they could reasonably affirm.
Each of these views argues for a link between self-determination and the value of a political community for its members. The instrumentalist view holds that I have an interest in my community's independence when my rights are protected by it. The democratic view claims that I have an interest in my community's independence when I have a voice in its law-making processes. And the associative view holds that I have an interest in my community's independence when I am a partner in a shared enterprise that I can affirm. These approaches contrast with a collectivist one, which holds that the independence of a political community is impersonally valuable in itself, regardless of its value for the individuals who make it up.
I believe the instrumentalist and the democratic accounts do provide us some reasons for favoring decolonization. But I also think these accounts take an overly onesided view of the value of political institutions for their members. For this reason, neither view can fully explain our intuitions about cases where decolonization seems appropriate.
Their failure springs from the fact that they see individuals' interests in their political institutions solely from the perspective of a beneficiary, an institutional "taker." But individuals have equally important interests in their institutions as political agents, or "makers." Political institutions can be valuable for individuals, not just because they receive important benefits from them, but also because they created those institutions together with others, and see those institutions as reflecting their shared projects and contributions. I argue that the associative view accommodates the truth in the preceding views while also improving on them, by better incorporating this "maker" perspective.
My strategy in the paper is thus dialectical: it is by showing the limits of other-initially plausible-accounts of self-determination that I make space for the associative view.
Before beginning, I offer a few clarificatory remarks. First, there is a widely held view of self-determination that I will not discuss in depth here: the nationalist theory.
This view holds that each cultural nation has a prima facie claim to its own political unit.
Territorial boundaries ought ideally to reflect cultural boundaries. 7 As a normative matter, I believe we should abandon the association between state and culture that 7 See Raz and Margalit 1994; Miller 2000. inspires the nationalist position. If it is to treat its citizens with equal respect, a government should not privilege a particular culture, as doing so devalues citizens of other nationalities, implying that they lack a full "stake" in its institutions. Instead, I
believe that a government should represent all the diverse cultural and linguistic groups on its territory, by extending them each some public recognition and support (e.g., through bilingual schooling, and a multicultural approach to official history and symbols). Because I reject the nationalist association between state and culture, I confine myself to liberal-democratic arguments for self-determination. 8 If the arguments I consider fail, this may show either that liberals must give nationalist considerations a larger role in their thinking, or alternatively, that they ought to abandon their commitment to self-determination.
Second, one might worry that the answer to my orienting question-why was decolonization morally warranted?-is simply too obvious to require extended analysis.
Most colonial regimes were imposed on an unwilling people through force and conquest.
Perhaps decolonization can be justified quite straightforwardly, on grounds that it undoes a past conquest. I believe this explanation is too simple. Nearly every current state was established in part through conquest: France conquered Normandy and Languedoc in the thirteenth century; the US conquered the Southwest in 1848 and Hawaii in 1893, and so on. 9 Yet surely we are not required to undo all the unjust conquests of the past. Nor can the issue be resolved simply by invoking the passage of time: Britain conquered Ireland and India much longer ago than the US conquered the Southwest. Instead, I believe that 8 For other liberal approaches, see Altman and Wellman 2009, Cohen 2010. 9 All states are, as a matter of historical fact, initially imposed by force. Charles Tilly emphasizes this point in his important work on the origins of national states in Europe: "coercive exploitation played a large part in the creation of the European states… " Tilly 1985, 169; 184. decolonization was required because continuing political association between colony and metropole was morally problematic, regardless of how that association was initially established. The goal of this paper is to understand what precisely this moral problem with continuing political association might be, and when it arises.
Third, I will not here provide an account of the right to establish a new state, e.g. through secession. Instead, I explore a more preliminary question: what is the value in collective self-determination? To argue for a right to secede, we must show that this value is of sufficient weight to hold others under a duty to allow the formation of a new state. This involves comparing the interests protected under the proposed right against countervailing considerations, such as other people's interests in the territory, the costs of secession to their expectations, the risk of civil war, instability, etc. And it involves comparing secession with other possible arrangements for protecting the interest in selfdetermination, such as internal autonomy, special representation rights, federalism, or devolution. I therefore remain agnostic here as to whether secession is the best means of realizing self-determination.
Finally, I leave aside the question of the best institutions for adjudicating and enforcing claims to self-determination. Who should judge when self-determination has been unjustly denied? How should self-determination be enforced: through self-help by the claimants, by the domestic state, or by the international community? Though these institutional questions are important, I cannot take them up. So I emphasize that my argument does not imply that when self-determination is denied, there is any unilateral right to claim territory by force. Instead, it only establishes a weaker claim: that the claimants have a strong interest in redrawing political boundaries. The question of the best way of accommodating that interest is one I defer to future work.
The Instrumentalist Approach
Why was decolonization justified? An initial, fairly obvious, thought is that decolonization was justified because of the grave injustices committed by colonial regimes: this is the instrumentalist approach.
The instrumentalist approach seems plausible when we examine the human rights abuses associated with colonial rule. An egregious case is the Congo Free State, the brainchild of Belgium's King Leopold. 10 Under Leopold's rule, the Congo generated immense profits through the exploitation of native peoples in the production of wild rubber. To get men to collect rubber, Free State officials seized their families and held them hostage until they brought their quota. If a district fell short, its residents were flogged, tortured and raped until the rubber was provided. Tyranny in the Congo was so pervasive that it depopulated the country: up to 50% of the inhabitants died by the time Leopold's rule ended.
Though the Congo Free State is a horrific case, it is not unrepresentative of colonial practices. Forced labor was also instituted in Dutch East India, French
Equatorial Africa, and Spanish America. In the settler states of North America, Australia, and New Zealand, indigenous inhabitants were dispossessed, subjected to "civilization" campaigns, and sometimes exterminated. In almost all colonies, Europeans institutionalized systems of racial and cultural discrimination. Reflecting on these facts, our basic commitment to human rights may seem enough to explain why colonized peoples had claims to self-determination.
In the contemporary literature, Allen Buchanan defends an instrumentalist account of self-determination of this kind. Buchanan argues that a state is morally justified in exercising political power over a population and territory if it "(1) does a credible job of protecting at least the most basic human rights of all those over whom it wields power and (2) it provides this protection through processes, policies, and actions that themselves respect human rights." 11 Basic human rights, for Buchanan, are interests that are constitutive of a decent life and necessary for individual flourishing. 12 He lists the right to life, the right to security of the person, the right against enslavement and involuntary servitude, the right to resources for subsistence, the most fundamental rights of due process and equality before the law, the right to freedom from religious persecution, the right to freedom of expression, the right to association, and the right against persecution on grounds of ethnicity, race, gender, or sexual preference. Buchanan 2004, 247. 12 See Buchanan 2004, 126-9 . 13 Buchanan 2004, 352 . For other arguments against a human right to democracy, see Altman and Wellman 2009 , Beitz 2009 , Rawls 2001 . Buchanan does hold that "where institutional resources exist for democratic authorization of government," such procedures must be utilized if the state is to be fully legitimate (Buchanan 2004, 254 We could certainly debate the extent to which these reforms enabled colonial regimes to deliver decent governance to their subject peoples. Still, I believe this history of colonial reform points out an important flaw in the instrumentalist approach. Suppose a reformed colonial regime had been reasonably successful in living up to its "benevolent" ideology. In that case, for the instrumentalist, no claim of selfdetermination could have been pressed against it. This is because, for the instrumentalist, there is no difference between being ruled by a domestic government (as long as it protects one's human rights) and being ruled by a foreign government (that does the same). But surely a subject people has an objection to being ruled by a foreign government, even if their colonizer successfully protects their most basic rights. While they are not subject to grave injustice, they are still denied self-rule. The committed instrumentalist may of course dispute this claim, arguing that benevolent colonialism is not always wrong. But I believe most people will agree that benevolent colonialism is problematic. For their sake-even if not for the committed instrumentalist-it is worth exploring what precisely seems so problematic about it.
The difficulty with instrumentalism here stems from the fact that it views the connection between the citizen and his political community solely from a beneficiary's perspective. But this overlooks the possibility that citizens might have a distinct interest in their political institutions: an interest in deciding together how to order their collective life. Citizens are not just the passive "takers" of their institutions; they also seek to be active "makers" of them. It might be just as important that citizens themselves create the 21 For useful discussion, see Crawford 2002, 260-289. institutions they live under (in their role as "makers") as that these institutions be good ones (from their perspective as "takers").
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The Democratic Approach
One way to interpret this idea is to hold that certain forms of collective decisionmaking are intrinsically valuable, and that what is wrong with colonial rule is that it denies these to subject populations. This explains decolonization on the basis that legitimate political power should be authorized, through democratic procedures, by those governed by that power. 23 As John Plamenatz puts it, "if it is right that governments should be responsible to the governed, then it is wrong for one people to impose their rule on another. Alien rule and democracy are clearly incompatible." 24 This democratic account seems more plausible than the instrumentalist one, precisely because it allows that self-rule is an important value. In that sense, it is an important competitor to the associative view I will argue for later. But the democratic view understands self-rule in a specific way. For the democrat, self-rule is an individual right to participate in a democratic decision: the right to vote yes or no on the policies that govern one's life.
What was wrong with colonial regimes, according to the democrat, is that they denied their subjects this chance to be enfranchised in the political decisions ruling them.
This democratic approach links self-determination to the existence of fair procedures for collective decision-making. These procedures include equal rights to vote for representatives, to associate in political parties, to express political views, and to compete for office. If such procedures exist, then according to the democrat, the laws 22 For similar distinctions, see Beitz 1989; Habermas 1996 . 23 Cobban 1970 Philpott 1995, 353 . 24 Plamenatz 1960, 1. reflect the decisions of a self-governing people, and as such they are worthy of respect.
Like the instrumentalist, the democrat connects the state's claim to independence to its legitimacy. But the democrat holds that legitimacy has a procedural as well as a substantive aspect. Even a substantively just state might be illegitimate, if its laws have not been authorized by those required to live by them.
If correct, this democratic argument accounts for a wider range of selfdetermination claims than instrumentalism did. Very few colonizers allowed their subjects electoral representation. Consider British India, for example. Although it is debatable whether an independent India in the 1890s would have improved the protection of human rights-and thus been warranted on instrumentalist grounds-for the democrat, this fact is not sufficient to give Britain the right to rule India. Since Indians were denied the opportunity to have any input into the making of the laws and policies by which they were governed, their institutions were not democratically legitimate.
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Note that the democrat need not take a purely procedural view, which holds that the authorization of laws through majority voting renders those laws legitimate regardless of their content. Many people rightly find this position implausible. Instead, the democrat simply maintains that the legitimacy of political power is partly dependent on whether the laws were authorized in a fair procedure, leaving space for a hybrid theory that incorporates the instrumentalist concerns about basic rights within a more complex proceduralist account.
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For our purposes, the essential question is: can a commitment to the intrinsic value of democratic procedures explain why decolonization was warranted? To answer, 25 There was some Indian political representation on local and provincial councils, but no nationwide democratic legislature. 26 See Beitz 1989; Waldron 1999; Christiano 2008. we need a closer look at the reasons why democracy might be intrinsically valuable.
Here, I consider one popular argument for democracy's intrinsic value, the public equality argument. This argument holds that disenfranchising people is wrong because it brands the excluded as inferior, or fails to treat their interests with equal concern. There are several versions of the public equality argument. Jeremy Waldron holds that the right to enfranchisement is grounded on individuals' claims to be treated as a "particular intelligence," with a unique view of justice worthy of consideration. 27 Charles Beitz argues that among citizens' interests in the choice of a political procedure is an interest in the recognition of his equal status as a citizen. 28 Procedures that disenfranchise some people undermine this interest by expressing the belief that certain people's opinions are worthy of less attention and respect. Finally, Thomas Christiano claims that enfranchisement is required because "it is not enough that justice is done; it must be seen to be done." 29 When one's opinion is treated as of no consequence, one may reasonably suspect that one's interests are not given equal consideration. Each of these theorists holds that disenfranchising people is wrong because it sends the message that they are second-class citizens, or less deserving of respect, or that their interests deserve lesser consideration.
Can this public equality argument be extended to provide a justification for decolonization? Certainly most colonial enterprises did exclude their subjects from participation in public affairs. Still, I doubt the importance of democratic enfranchisement fully explains the value of self-determination. To see why, consider the following case:
27 Waldron 1999, 238-9; 312 . 28 Beitz 1989, 109-110 . 29 The problem is that on the public equality argument, we ought to be indifferent between a wider democratic metropole, in which colonial subjects are enfranchised, and an independent democracy on the colonized territory. Both are ways that individuals might be enabled to say yes or no to the decisions governing their lives. But intuitively, we are not indifferent among these options. Instead, it seems that a colonized territory has a claim to independence when its citizens were incorporated without their agreement.
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One might object here that a unilaterally imposed regime, like the one envisaged in Political Incorporation, cannot be democratically legitimate. The thought is that this particular decision-to incorporate Libya into France-was not democratic, even if later decisions were. But suppose that just prior to incorporation, a referendum had been held in the combined Franco-Libyan territory, and that a majority (composed almost entirely of metropolitan French) had voted in favor. Would the annexation then be democratically legitimate? On the "individual enfranchisement" view, it seems it would: no individual has been denied a voice and vote in the decision here. Yet, intuitively, the annexation still seems objectionable, because Libya has been denied a separate say in the decision.
This explanation, however, appeals to a right to collective self-determination that is not reducible to a set of individual rights to be democratically enfranchised. It is Libya, not On the public equality argument, it is hard to see why Ireland and Algeria had any claim to establish distinct political units. They were enfranchised within the wider metropole. And though they had substantive grievances dating from their colonial history, arguably these grievances had begun to be addressed through the political process, and might have continued to be addressed in this fashion. But this ignores the alienation of the Irish and Algerians, and is inconsistent with popular sentiment of the 33 For related discussion of the democratic "boundary problem," see Abizadeh 2008 , Goodin 2007 , Miller 2009 . Agné 2010 argues that the boundary problem can be solved only by instituting a global demos. I believe his argument raises much the same worries about colonialism as the Libya example does. Abizadeh 2008 makes an exception to his "unbounded demos thesis" for persistent minorities. It is unclear if the Libyans are a persistent minority, but if so, this might justify separate political institutions for them. 34 Shepherd 2006, 19-54 . 35 Ranelegh 1983. period, which saw Irish and Algerian independence as quintessentially just causes. If these reflections are correct, then the public equality argument-while plausible in its own right-cannot provide a warrant for decolonization. Public equality may be a demand of justice, but it does not help us draw the boundaries of the political community.
An Associative Account of Self-Determination
Recall that a key problem with the instrumentalist approach was that it focused only on citizens' interests (as institutional "takers") in benefiting from a reasonably just state's rule, through protection of their most basic rights. In response, we held that citizens have an equally important interest in self-rule, in being the authors (or "makers")
of the institutions to which they are subject. Are there avenues other than democratic participation by which to understand a citizen's interest, as a "maker" of his institutions, in self-rule? I think there are. An individual can have an interest in his society's independence if he reasonably affirms his participation in the relationship of political cooperation that undergirds its institutions. This view requires that our state be structured such that: (a) our personal autonomy, as "takers," is guaranteed by our political institutions; and that (b) as "makers," we affirm or endorse these institutions.
The associative view derives inspiration from Hegel's notion that freedom has both an objective and a subjective component. 36 Objective freedom requires that political institutions be structured to guarantee their members' personal autonomy, by protecting essential basic rights (in this, it agrees with the instrumentalist). But Hegel argues that citizens' freedom is not exhausted by these considerations: it has a further subjective sense. Freedom additionally requires that individuals who sustain state institutions 36 Hegel 1996, 313. together experience this activity as an expression of themselves, not as something that they are coerced into performing by an alien power. To the extent that citizens attain subjective freedom, they will see their state as a creation of their own free cooperation, not as an institution of subjugation. The idea is that there is an important good in achieving minimally just institutions through the willing contributions of those subject to them, rather than through their imposition by force. This is the same good we achieve when we act on our own freely formed intentions, rather than being forced to act on the will of someone else. On the associative view, then, while it is important that state institutions be minimally just, it is also important that members affirm their state's rule and willingly contribute to sustaining it, if they are to be properly subject to its power.
Like the democrat, the associativist holds that political legitimacy has two elements, a substantive element and an endorsement element. Even a substantively just state might therefore be illegitimate, if its subjects widely reject its rule.
I think interpreting the citizen's agency connection to the state in these Hegelian terms captures our concerns about colonialism. What is striking about India or Ireland is that colonial rulers were unable to bring their subjects to affirm their association with the metropole. The alienation of colonized peoples had historical roots in past conquest, and in the fact that the colonizers set themselves apart as a superior class. But what is important is not the specific roots of alienation but the fact that a sense of oppression on the part of these peoples persisted and was difficult to eradicate, even once attempts to address their grievances were made. Though an objective basis for affirming their institutions was perhaps in place, their subjective ability to do so was not.
Not every political association initially imposed by force remains incapable of generating affirmation as time goes on, however. Consider the case of Hawaii. The acquisition of Hawaii occurred through a process similar to the acquisition of India or Ireland: in 1893, a group of American plantation owners overthrew the Hawaiian monarchy, and imprisoned its queen. 37 Five years later, Hawaii was annexed to the US.
There was a case for restoring the monarchy in the aftermath of annexation, and a nationalist movement pressed this case in the early 1900s. But over time, the situation in Hawaii changed. The political power of the plantation-owning class was destroyed, and racial discrimination against Hawaiians was gradually ameliorated. When Hawaiian statehood was submitted to a referendum in 1954, 93% of the population voted in favor.
So sometimes a political relationship that was established through an unjust conquest can come, over time, to feature both reasonably just governance and widespread endorsement by participants. If so, then according to the associative view, any reason to restore independence to the former colony is superseded.
To see why affirmation matters in addition to minimally just rule, we should begin by emphasizing that "the state" is not an entirely separate agency from the people who make it up. Instead, the state is reproduced by its members' cooperative activity, including their obedience to law; payment of taxes; voting; and cooperation with the police, judges, and public officials. The "people's" collective activity, however, takes place against the background threat of coercion by government agents. So we might wonder: does this joint activity implicate the wills of those involved? Or is it simply something they are forced into? A structure of participatory intentions can be achieved in several ways, and because the state is a coercive institution, we need to pay special attention to whether people form participatory intentions only as a result of manipulation or duress. Though the state is a coercive institution, I believe the wills of its members are sometimes manifested in their joint activity. This is the case when citizens reasonably affirm their participation in this shared enterprise, according to the following conditions:
39 Of course, these examples are culturally biased, and reflect civic life in a modern, Western institution. But though the content of citizens' participatory intentions will differ across political forms, I believe some such structure will undergird any widely endorsed political institution. As long as the political form allows for binding collective rule-setting and centralized enforcement, I believe we can apply the term "state" to it, in a broad sense. 40 Kutz elaborates a minimalist conception of joint action that is appropriate to large and diffuse groups, such as a citizenry (Kutz 2000, 90-96) . I elaborate a theory of citizenship as joint intentional action at greater length in Stilz 2009, ch. 7.
(1) Minimal Justice: Citizens' relationship of political cooperation must be reasonable to value, because it protects the most basic human rights of each member, particularly their personal security, subsistence, and ability to form and express their own opinions;
(2) Subjective Legitimacy: Citizens, by and large, must actually affirm their political cooperation together, under these minimally just background conditions.
On this view, a state's claim to political independence is derived, not just from the minimal justice of its rule, but also from the additional subjective value of willing affirmation of a relationship of political cooperation by a wide majority of participants.
While it is important that the state protect basic rights, it is additionally important that it be sustained-to the extent possible-through the unforced activity of the citizenry. I believe there are both instrumental and intrinsic reasons for valuing rational affirmation.
Affirmation is an important instrumental good because without it, people will have to be "forced to be free," and this makes for a less stable, more repressive political community.
And affirmation is an important intrinsic good because it allows citizens to see political institutions as their own creation, which gives those institutions a relational value for them that goes beyond the benefits they provide.
The instrumental reasons for valuing affirmation derive from the fact that it is better for everyone if states can achieve willing compliance, as this enhances the stability of legitimate institutions. Colonial rulers have to force people to cooperate in sustaining the institutions they impose, and we can expect that-since it is likely to be resistedtheir rule will be imposed with significant repression. Raz 1986, 208-9; Jones 1999, 354-6. 42 43 Because he shares a commitment to this endeavor, then, he will prefer that he and his compatriots work out their own policies, even when that means accepting some decisions with which he personally disagrees. By valuing their joint endeavor, and standing ready to play his role in it, he associates his football team is valuable for its players: since they together produced it, they share in its wins and losses, even when-as individuals-they did not solely cause them.
Let me clarify a few aspects of my argument. First, I should emphasize that citizens' affirmation of their cooperative political relationship is valuable only when it is 43 It might be objected that only the founding generation actually creates an institution. But later generations willingly reproduce it, and in so doing they may "give" the institutions "to themselves" because they participate voluntarily, and they affirm their activity in sustaining these institutions.
authentic, and the state's background protection of its citizens' most basic human rights is necessary to ensure this authenticity. For my will to be implicated in my state, I must not be manipulated or coerced into affirming it. Where an endorsement is expressed out of fear, manipulation, or indoctrination, it carries no moral weight. Minimal guarantees of my personal security, subsistence, and of my ability to form and express my own opinions-including basic liberties of conscience, speech, and association-are necessary conditions for any expression of authentic affirmation.
While free background conditions do require human rights protection, on my view, they do not require full democracy. One can imagine a range of liberties that enable citizens to freely affirm their state, beginning with freedoms of speech and thought, and extending all the way to political participation rights. Democratic rights-including the right to vote, to form parties, and to run for office-provide robust guarantees that citizens' affirmation is authentic. But it is also possible for citizens to authentically affirm their participation in the state even where its institutions are not fully democratic, so long as they are free to form and express dissenting views.
Second, one might object that, in practice, a state can be empowered by the contributions of those who place no intrinsic value on their political relationships, people much like Einstein. Citizens can be motivated to contribute to collective political action for many reasons, including pragmatic calculation, self-interest, or even fear. I do not deny this. Yet another reason why people sometimes cooperate collectively is because they endorse a shared project and care about its success. When this is the case, I believe their joint venture has a relational value for participants that deserves our recognition and respect. Because widely affirmed political relationships are especially valuable for those who engage in them, I believe this gives us reason not to destroy or undermine such relationships. I also believe that this relational value may give us pro tanto reason to reconfigure political boundaries in cases where territorially concentrated subgroups are currently unable to enjoy this value. These reasons for recognizing and respecting a shared political relationship are not equally present in cases where constituents sustain institutions out of fear, self-interest, or pragmatic calculation.
Third, it is important to see that the value of rational affirmation emphasized here is not the same as a requirement of individual consent. Consent is generally taken to require alternative options. But rational affirmation can be present even where there are no alternatives, as long as we endorse the option on which we act. Most citizens were born into their state and cannot easily leave it. Still, they may see their own activity in sustaining it as something in which they willingly participate. It is also not necessary that every individual endorse their state in order for the "public" good of rational affirmation to exist. It is only necessary that there be a widespread sense of willing cooperation.
Moreover, to be a willing cooperator, it is not necessary that I endorse all my state's laws.
Just as I can disagree with my golf club's policies-and even work to change themwithout resigning my membership, so I can be a willing political cooperator even when I disagree with many laws, so long as I affirm my particular state's right to rule.
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It might be objected here that even if most citizens are willing cooperators, unwilling individuals are wronged by being forced to participate in a state. But this is often implausible. Following Kant and Rawls, I hold that each individual is subject to a natural duty of justice that he cannot fulfill without participation in a legitimate state.
Without a political authority, many of our rights-including property and contract 44 For this point, see Pasternak 2012. rights-would remain indeterminate and subject to reasonable disagreement, and impartial mechanisms for their enforcement would be lacking. It would be impossible for individuals to do justice to one another in such anarchic conditions. I accept that legitimate political authority can take a number of different forms, which are not limited to the modern, European sovereign state. But if unwilling anarchists or holdouts refuse participation in any legitimate political institution-perhaps because they deny a duty to live together on just terms-then I believe their non-affirmation should be discounted. So as long as those persons' human rights are guaranteed, we do them no wrong by subjecting them to a legitimate institution, because such an institution is necessary to secure the basic rights of others.
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Yet sometimes people may fail to affirm their state for other reasons: not because they are unwilling to cooperate on fair terms, but because they seek an alternative configuration of political units. I think these failures of affirmation should be taken more seriously. One reason for such failures seriously is that the Kantian argument-which emphasizes that state coercion is necessary for securing background justice-provides no way of deciding how many states we should have, or which particular states should rule which particular groups. All the argument shows is that each individual has a responsibility to contribute to coordination and collective action in order to provide the essentials of public justice. But there are a variety of ways such coordination and collective action might be structured. And here, I believe the widespread affirmation of the political community has a role to play. Affirmation shows that a political authority stands in a special moral relationship with a particular group, a relationship that no alternative authority could claim. This fact-that a particular state is the product of a 45 See Wellman 2005. widely affirmed joint project among citizens-singles it out as the one with the right to rule that particular community. 46 Such affirmation is generated when a number of individuals share interlocking intentions to willingly comply with the laws, to pay taxes, to vote (in a democracy), and to cooperate with the police, judges, and state officials. To generate this special right to rule, it is not necessary that every member of the community willingly cooperate with their state; but it is important that most do.
One might finally worry that my associativist view is not meaningfully distinct from the nationalist approach. In reply, I emphasize that my associative argument
interprets "peoples" not as cultural groups, but rather as groups defined by willing political cooperation together. The "people's" relationship consists in a pattern of voluntary coordinated behavior that can support organized political authority. Though this pattern of political cooperation may overlap with cultural ties, it does not have to.
Citizens who have cooperated to sustain a multinational state-Belgium, India, or Canada-will count as "peoples" on my view, though they would not qualify as national cultures. Of course, "nationalism" can also refer to a shared sense of civic or political identity, and I accept that my view comes close to this use of the term. I should stress, though, that on my view there is no independent criterion for delineating "peoples,"
beyond the fact that existing political institutions either succeed or fail at generating the affirmation of those they rule. So I deny that "the people" is a prepolitical entity: instead, a people can only be brought into being by engaging in institutionalized cooperation together, and coming to affirm that cooperation.
To sum up, then, on the associative view, a citizen will have an interest in his community's independence if three conditions are met: cannot be brought to affirm their minimally just state, they will have a remedial claim to create legitimate institutions that they can affirm. Generally, members of a just state will respond over time by affirming its practices of cooperation. But it is possible for some members to remain alienated from it. This is especially likely to be the case when there is a past history of coercion, conquest, and colonial oppression. It may also occur when a territorially distinct subgroup finds that their political priorities on many issues go unrecognized by the majority. So despite the fact that a people is not a prepolitical entity, sometimes existing political institutions fail to bring a "people" into being. In these cases, I believe that groups with practices of political cooperation that can be more achieved in a manner that is not unduly costly, and that enables both parties to pursue more widely affirmed political relationships that better reflect their priorities, then there is a pro tanto reason to allow it. Still, this reason may be weaker than in the case of a warranted failure. It may therefore be appropriate to impose higher "exit" costs on these groups, or to explore options for self-determination short of independence, such as federalism or devolution.
In conclusion, I wish to make three final points. First, the associative account raises many problems of practical application. For reasons of space, I can only offer a sketch of how these might be addressed. In order to claim self-determination, a group must be territorially organized and possess representative practices that can serve as the basis for constructing minimally just institutions. Since any territory will necessarily include some who do not endorse the prevailing political project, it is important that the claimant group be broadly inclusive. Where the claimant group is intermixed with dispersed minorities, it may be appropriate to demand that it grant these minorities special representation rights, or accommodations on issues of intense concern to them.
Qualified claimant groups could include existing political subunits, separatist parties, and national liberation movements that represent a broadly inclusive, territorially-based constituency.
It is also difficult to be mathematically precise about the level and intensity of alienation that triggers concern. But the associative view would support the use of plebiscites or referenda to ascertain people's wishes on matters of their political status.
Persistent majorities favoring independence, produced under conditions of high voter turnout, and sustained over a series of votes, would provide evidence to support a selfdetermination claim. In such cases, I believe the overarching state has a moral obligation to negotiate an institutional configuration that the alienated group can more readily affirm-by redrawing boundaries to create new subunits, granting more internal autonomy, or in severe cases allowing for political independence.
Applying the minimal justice condition may also be challenging, since it can be hard to ascertain whether a group can sustain human-rights protecting institutions prior to their independence. But this problem can be handled by a staged independence process, conditional on certain benchmarks being met. For example, a limited sphere of local governance might be granted initially, with a state or international authority standing ready to intervene if abuses occur. If good performance is achieved, greater independence-where warranted, extending even to full sovereign statehood-could then be granted over time.
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A second worry is that on my account, both minimal justice and subjective legitimacy are valuable. But which has the higher priority when the two conflict?
Suppose a colonial power now rules in a way that protects its subjects' most basic rights, but its regime is not widely affirmed. If it decolonized, however, the native inhabitants would establish a highly repressive regime, perhaps because deeply rooted social cleavages would lead one segment of society to oppress another. Should the colonizers leave?
In reply, I highlight once again that the minimal justice and affirmation elements of self-determination are inherently connected. Because basic rights must be protected for affirmation to be genuine, I believe minimal justice should take priority over subjective legitimacy in cases of conflict. Were the colonizer to withdraw in the case above, this would not in fact promote the subject people's self-determination, since the successor regime would fail to safeguard the preconditions for it. For these reasons, my view grants little weight to citizens' embrace of a highly repressive regime, even one with religious or cultural foundations in their society. Though people can affirm an undemocratic social order, this affirmation must be generated in sufficiently free background conditions (with, at the very least, protection for personal security, subsistence, and freedom of conscience, speech, and association) in order to count as authentic.
The priority that my associative view places on minimal justice sets it apart from other views-like Michael Walzer's-that emphasize subjective legitimacy alone. 47 Keohane 2003. Walzer argues that outsiders should presume a certain "fit" between a community and its political institutions, even if the regime is highly oppressive, as long it does not commit grievous moral wrongs, such as massacre, enslavement, or expulsion of large numbers of people. 48 In contrast, I believe we are not entitled to presume "fit" unless citizens'
opinions are formed under sufficiently free conditions, and unless those opinions have some channel for public expression. The people's affirmation must not be coerced or manufactured by their own regime is it is to count as genuine.
If a subject people cannot currently sustain institutions that meet these preconditions, decolonization may be delayed until they develop the political capacity to do so. Colonial institutions can be provisionally legitimate during this period. Some groups may lack the capacity to sustain minimally just institutions as a result of exploitation, or past "divide and rule" tactics, and in this case, the former colonial power has a remedial duty to provide them material aid in developing those institutions.
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Finally, one might worry that my view could be invoked to support cultural nationalist movements. I do not deny that some alienated cultural groups might currently claim self-determination rights on this account. But this is not a necessary consequence of the associative view. To the extent that cultural minorities are presently alienated, I
believe this has its roots in the fact that many states have adopted an illegitimate "nationstate" ideal that privileges the majority culture. I believe liberal states should reduce their association with the majority culture, and give culturally diverse citizens an equal stake in their institutions and public spaces. The more culturally "neutral" states become, the 48 Walzer 1980, 211. 49 If a group cannot establish minimally just institutions, even with aid, then they may not claim selfdetermination. Their situation may be tragic, but since a key purpose of the state is protecting the human rights of its members, this purpose must be fulfilled in some other way. For a similar view, see Altman and Wellman 2009, 195. more likely they are to bring diverse citizenries to affirm their cooperation together. Were such a "cultural neutrality" requirement implemented, I believe that the practical implications of my associativist view would differ markedly from the nationalist one.
Though current patterns of subjective alienation may reflect patterns of cultural distinctiveness, they need not do so.
